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 1 
 
The Autobiographical Shoulder of Ernest Amory Codman: 
Crafting Medical Meaning in the Twentieth Century 
 
CAITJAN GAINTY 
 
SUMMARY: This essay offers a reconsideration of the historical significance of Ernest 
Amory Codman’s autobiographical preface to his 1934 text The Shoulder, Rupture of the 
Supraspinatus Tendon and Other Lesions on or about the Subacromial Bursa and its 
reception, in its own time and at the end of the twentieth century. It concentrates on the 
aesthetics of identity and the ways in which these are woven into the political, 
professional, and cultural contexts of these two periods. It argues finally that Codman’s 
style of life writing, both in the autobiography and throughout his texts, served as an 
important historical actor that more generally demonstrates the possibilities in 
approaching the history of medicine from aesthetic angles. In this way, it also calls for a 
tabling of the more canonical concerns about the American medical profession in the 
twentieth century in order to focus more empirically on questions concerning the 
development of medical meaning more broadly conceived. 
 
KEYWORDS: Ernest Amory Codman, failure, medical aesthetics, professionalization, 
outcome measurement, evidence-based medicine, autobiography 
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In 1989, Avedis Donabedian, a leading authority in the burgeoning area of quality 
assessment practices in medicine, held a séance of sorts in the pages of the health policy 
journal Milbank Quarterly. He began,  
I intend to summon from a shadowy past someone who should have been 
recognized always as a towering figure in the history of our field. It is Ernest 
Amory Codman whom I invoke. . . . I hope to celebrate the man, making amends, 
in my small way, for the neglect he has so long unjustly suffered.1 
This was not an exceptional occasion. Since the late 1960s, the early twentieth-century 
surgeon Ernest Amory Codman had been frequently called upon in medical quality 
assessment literature.2 Echoing the desire to rescue Codman from the ungrateful past and 
apply his spirit to the urgent needs of the medical present, appeals to the Boston reformer 
rang from the pages of scholarly and professional journals across the nation.3 
 The Codman phenomenon had much to do with his “End Result System,” a medical 
efficiency practice of outcome measurement he developed in the opening years of the 
twentieth century and publicly proposed around 1910, and which advocates of quality 
assessment from the 1960s onward saw as the prototype for their own attempts at reform. 
But it seemed to be inspired equally, if not more, by the man himself, a “towering 
figure,” as the opening tribute put it, in medicine’s story. His admirers christened 
Codman a prophet, a visionary figure whose system of outcome measurement and sense 
of rightness had pitted him against an early-century process of medical 
professionalization that placed medical authority and power before good, effective, 
quality practice. For everything that he represented, his colleagues had rejected him, a 
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rejection taken by his late-century devotees as emblematic of a systemic professional 
hubris that harked back to the Progressive period but would not be widely acknowledged 
or addressed until many decades and scandals later.  
  Nearly all of this heroic story would have been very familiar to Codman’s friends 
and colleagues. Indeed, it was a narrative that Codman himself repeated in much of his 
outcome measurement writing, though nowhere more dramatically than his 1934 tour de 
force The Shoulder, Rupture of the Supraspinatus Tendon and Other Lesions in or about 
the Subacromial Bursa.4 Comprising three parts, with the second being a study of the 
anatomy, diagnosis, and care of the shoulder, Codman’s text included an 
autobiographical preface and a polemical epilogue that elevated the monograph from 
clinical text into what Codman called a “literary sandwich” (the study of the shoulder 
was, he said, “the meaty middle”).5 It was in his preface where Codman regaled his 
readers with the story echoed by reformers decades later—the fateful epic of one man’s 
courage in a losing battle against professional norms, contemptuous contemporaries, and 
ostracism, with only his sense of rightness and the hope of future vindication to give him 
strength. “Honors, except those I have thrust on myself,” he wrote, “are conspicuously 
absent on my chart, but I am able to enjoy the hypothesis that I may receive some from a 
more receptive generation.”6 
Such pronouncements notwithstanding, the way Codman was remembered and 
celebrated was not inevitable; reformers later in the century had other narrative options. 
They might have looked, for example, to the American College of Surgeons (ACS), to 
which Codman contributed and whose record as a body of efficiency reform began in this 
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era and continued throughout the years that separated Codman from his resurrection. This 
narrative would have had an entirely different trajectory, one that celebrated Codman’s 
End Result System as an early and important contributor to mainstream standardizing 
efforts.7 
And there were other characters that late-century commentators could have called 
upon in place of Codman. Among their number were Codman’s colleague and fellow 
reformer Richard Cabot, the neurosurgeon and one-time Codman collaborator Harvey 
Cushing, industrial efficiency expert Frank Gilbreth, well-known obstetrician Robert 
Dickinson, and perhaps most famous of all, the brothers Mayo, whom Codman had 
grudgingly but admiringly described as having “monopolized Clinical Truth” and made 
of Rochester, Minnesota, a medical mecca.8 Then there was the influential Modern 
Hospital, a journal dedicated to medical efficiency from its inception. Codman had 
something these others did not, however—a particular set of personal characteristics and 
a peculiar brand of life writing that found a fitting context both in his time and half a 
century later.  
Building on Susan Reverby’s insightful and now classic 1981 article on Codman, 
along with Christopher Crenner’s more recent discussion, both of which examined the 
complex relationships between profession building and efficiency reform that 
contextualize Codman’s story,9 this essay explores the ways in which Codman’s literary 
self-fashioning circulated across the century. This crosses into the terrain of 
(auto)biography,10 but unlike biographical work on Codman (the best known of which is 
William Mallon’s meticulously detailed portrait),11 this work examines how Codman 
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created his own identity, such that he was able to position himself in such different 
medical contexts. And in this way, we will see a refracted glimpse of the shape of 
medical identities and their meanings at two different moments of efficiency reform. 
 Though a close reading of Codman’s autobiographical stylings may be regarded in 
general as a useful addition to the genre of medical autobiography in the early-century 
period,12 a fresh examination of the work may also help us improve some new tools of 
historical approach. Among these is an aesthetic lens. Though The Shoulder has survived 
as an important addition to the medical canon, on close inspection we will see how it is 
also an ironic recast of the details of Codman’s own life, a deployment of the 
autobiographical form to juxtapose two “realities”—one that colleagues and readers at 
the time of its publication would have experienced, and another that he crafts for his 
autobiography—for his own political ends. The general theme Codman adopts in this 
retelling is one of professional failure, but though Codman’s autobiography is 
preoccupied with the futility of his life (the same futility echoed by late-century 
commentators), its details do not conform to the details of Codman’s life as they emerge 
out of the archive. Reading Codman’s own autobiographical accounting of his life and 
work alongside the published and archival sources thus produces strange distortions and 
artifacts that beg further attention.  
 Furthermore, there are dueling realities within the preface itself. Even as Codman’s 
commentary stridently broadcasts his heroic failings—all documentation of his “sense of 
isolation” from his colleagues for his rejection of their “irrational” views and his lifelong 
“suspic[ion] . . . of being peculiar”13—the details he offers resist a reading of either his 
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life or his End Result System as failure. In this way, Codman’s own writing and the 
commentary of his contemporaries on his work offer a curious gloss on his supposed 
failure of a life, in some cases by disputing it with an explicit inventory of his many 
successes, in others by pointing toward a much more complex set of circumstances that 
governed the uptake of Codman’s famous system.  
 If, as this essay argues in its first sections, Codman’s autobiographical preface 
offers insight into the political ramifications of Codman’s play with his own identity in 
his own time, then the reading of Codman’s life at century’s end, in which the 
significance of Codman came to rest on a straight reading of Codman as precisely the 
failure he describes himself to be, must also be brought into new focus. This tension is 
taking up in the second part of this essay. These narratives almost universally offered a 
portrait of Codman as a reformer rejected because of the threat he posed to professional 
authority. That these accounts of Codman’s ostracism and professional failures so closely 
tracked onto Codman’s autobiography clarifies the usefulness and endurance of his trope 
of the ostracized, outcast, failed self.14 It also has something to tell us about the pressures 
of a late-century medical moment that guided commentators away from critical 
considerations of Codman’s constructions of his life and toward a view of this life as he 
had crafted it along one level alone. In their preoccupation with Codman’s 
autobiographical details, late-century commentators unintentionally revealed how central 
the aesthetics of representation really are to medicine’s construction. In exploring the 
multiple layers of meaning in both Codman’s writing and renaissance, then, we follow 
the complex warp and weft of memory, politics, and aesthetics that make up the historical 
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fabric of American medicine.15 
   
The Shoulder 
For a “biographic” text written to describe the “life he [had] led,” Codman’s preface to 
The Shoulder stands as a peculiar example of life writing. Not only does it take the form 
of a preface to a medical treatise, it also focuses narratively on a very short period of 
time, and on a very particular set of incidents that by and large had little to do specifically 
with Codman’s work on the shoulder. After briefly noting the genesis of Codman’s 
interest in the shoulder, the text abruptly states that it will not in fact cover much more in 
the way of biographic detail. For this, readers are directed to an accompanying chart. 
“Necessity for economy,” Codman writes, had forced him “to reduce [his] life history” to 
that form.16 (See Figure 1.)  
 After Codman’s life is thus set aside, his preface informs the reader that this 
biography would occupy itself primarily with his system of efficiency reform, that “great 
and still unsuccessful interest of [his] life,” the End Result System.17 Its foundational idea 
is “merely the common-sense notion that every hospital should follow every patient it 
treats, long enough to determine whether or not the treatment has been successful, and 
then to inquire ‘if not, why not?’ with a view to preventing similar failures in future.”18 
This definition later would become the most widely quoted phrase of Codman’s The 
Shoulder, since it narrated so neatly the characteristics of both Codman and his system 
that would seem most critical to his late-century commentators.19  
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 What follows in the preface is the story of a man and an idea. Though it covers a 
relatively short period of Codman’s career, it is chronologically vague, even disordered—
a quality that late-century commentators would unintentionally make much use of.20 
Beginning in the summer of 1910, the season his end results “monomania” began,21 
Codman’s tale primarily details a series of events over the next seven years, ending when 
he left his work in Boston to aid in the aftermath of the massive explosion of a French 
munitions ship in Halifax Harbor in 1917. This period was, according to Codman, an 
“unsuccessful” time, one “over which I have toiled harder and suppressed more regrets, 
than over any other star-gazing period of my career.”22 And though this periodization 
represents just a fraction of Codman’s life and work, Codman assures the reader that it is 
emblematic of the futility of his reforming mission. Certainly, it was remembered and 
repeated as such later in the century.23  
 One major moment in the narrative is Codman’s departure from the Massachusetts 
General Hospital (MGH) in 1914. Codman had worked there for fifteen years, rising 
from assistant surgeon—a post that he had acquired, as he explains in another text, 
“through family position, acquaintances, well-wishers on the Staff and Board of 
Trustees”—to a senior member of staff.24 As Codman describes it, he had received his 
position through nepotism and kept it because of the seniority system then in place.25 
Now, after years of working without satisfactory results within the hospital’s system to 
reform it, he was resigning as part of a demonstration against a tradition he considered 
antithetical, for its privileging of time served over results attained, to his End Result 
System. To drive home his point, he then immediately reapplied for the prestigious 
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position of Surgeon-in-Chief. In the words of the preface, upon hearing that his 
resignation had been accepted, Codman  
wrote again, asking to be appointed Surgeon-in-Chief on the ground that the 
results of my treatment of patients at their hospital during the last ten years had 
been better than those of other surgeons. I had tabulated my results in case they 
should ask to see them, but as no one had ever inquired into the results of other 
surgeons, there was of course nothing with which to compare mine. . . . Naturally, 
my letter was ignored, and I was not appointed Surgeon-in-Chief.26 
Codman points to this instance as evidence of the futility of his ventures, but this gesture 
was more like failure with an asterisk. In spite of Codman’s performative declaration of 
his lack of success, despite indeed his declaration that his “efforts on every interest have 
been largely futile,”27 and that he had “always been thinking, or saying, one thing or 
another, with which other doctors did not agree,”28 he notes in the preface that “it was not 
long before the seniority system was dropped, and a portion of [MGH’s] budget became 
devoted to a Follow-up System.”29 And though Codman had railed against the MGH in 
the outcome reporting of his own hospital, which he had opened in 1911 (and thus while 
still employed at MGH) precisely in order to demonstrate how an end result hospital 
could operate,30 it was only a few years after this resignation before the hospital rehired 
Codman to produce his famous Registry of Bone Sarcoma, which was finally published 
in 1925. In fact, as the preface notes, by 1917, when Codman left for Halifax (and closed 
his hospital for good), his colleagues at MGH were coming around to his side, the 
“follow-up system and the special assignment policy,” which assigned cases based on 
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merit and particular expertise, he had put in place at MGH “were flourishing.”31 Indeed, 
according to Codman, far from failing, all of his ventures were actually on the brink of 
success in this period. As he himself tells it in this passage, it was not his colleagues or 
his eccentricity but the war that interrupted this progress toward reform. 
 Despite this evidence, Codman’s self-proclaimed failure to convince both the 
medical establishment and a public that outcomes mattered seemed to be compounded in 
another key moment he narrates, a moment that has followed Codman throughout the 
literature. It was his dramatic unveiling, as chairman at a 1915 meeting of the Suffolk 
District Medical Society, of an eight-foot-long cartoon illustrating his views about the 
problems in medicine that his End Result System would correct. (See Figure 2.) 
 This monumental work of art captured in caricature and metaphor the conspiracy of 
hospital trustees, physicians, surgeons, the Harvard Medical School, and public that 
worked in concert to shield medicine from the accountability that his End Result System 
would bring. Produced on commission by Philip Hale, a local artist and Codman’s friend, 
the cartoon featured at its center the “Back Bay Golden Goose-Ostrich,” its small head 
buried in a “hill of humbug,” and its hip emblazoned with the tattoo “Back Bay.” This 
was a representation of one Boston’s wealthiest neighborhoods, whose citizenry—all 
potential patients and benefactors of the MGH—Codman accused of ignoring the 
importance of accountable medical practice even as they continued to send its wealth 
(here in the form of golden eggs) to “humbug” physicians. To the fowl’s right, the MGH 
Board of Trustees sat in front of the Harvard Medical School debating whether telling the 
truth to patients would halt the steady slow of funds, while in the far background, 
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witnessing the whole affair, Harvard president Abbott Lawrence Lowell wondered to 
himself if clinical truth was “incompatible with medical science.” “Could my clinical 
professors make a living without humbug?” his caricature mused.32 
 The reception of the cartoon among those present, which included the mayor of 
Boston, was reportedly poor. Codman had to resign his chairmanship of the Medical 
Society, but his description of the social and professional fallout he offers in his preface 
is again moderated: 
My wife and friends had to explain the whole matter daily to other friends, and 
everybody had to say that what I was after was all right, but my methods were 
abominable. As nobody else was doing anything about what all admitted was true 
and important, I had no methods to compare with mine, which did not seem to me 
either dishonorable or cruel to any one in particular.33 
Thus again, Codman’s rejection came with no small measure of mitigation. In the main, 
the criticism that followed the unveiling was indeed clearly leveled at his methods, but 
not, notably, at the truth or importance of his goals, which many of his colleagues 
vocally supported. This was reflected in the letters he received after the event, some 
quite harsh in tone. As one disappointed colleague wrote, “After having quarreled with 
the trustees of the Massachusetts General Hospital the wretched appearance you made 
with your cartoon at the medical meeting was enough to break your standing with the 
medical profession, unless one was charitable enough to think you mentally deranged.”34 
He then, however, signed off, “hoping you may see things in a new light, even at the age 
of forty-seven, and become a true reformer in hospital management is the wish of one 
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who has known you since you began your career as a surgeon.”35 
 Others were more sympathetic. Richard Cabot, a colleague and (at the time) friend 
of Codman’s, offered his support by writing, “The incident illustrates the shade of truth 
in [George] Bernard Shaw’s remark that the medical profession (like every other 
profession) is a conspiracy against the public.”36 Indeed, to Cabot, it was Codman’s 
censure by the Suffolk Medical Society—not his unveiling of the cartoon—that was the 
more pressing problem. He was himself invested in reforming projects that would 
produce greater transparency and accountability to the public, weakening the 
professional conspiracy that Shaw and others feared.37 This is all the more telling, since 
Cabot suffered sometimes scathing public criticism from Codman explicitly because he 
held a high position at the MGH, which Codman viewed as a form of professional 
entrenchment that was incompatible with real reform. This was good enough reason to 
subject him personally to a kind of “harmless ridicule,” intended to draw out the 
essential antiprogressive nature of the medical profession more generally.38 (Noted 
Codman, in defense of the application of this tactic to Cabot and others, “I doubt if their 
feelings were hurt or even their self-esteem.”)39 
 The medical community seems to have quickly recovered from the cartoon’s 
affront. When the August 1917 issue of the Boston Medical and Surgical Journal (the 
forerunner to the prestigious New England Journal of Medicine) published papers and 
discussions of a meeting held by the newly formed Section of Hospital Administration at 
the Massachusetts Medical Society, it included a paper of Codman’s on hospital 
morbidity reports, and gave Codman credit not just for the meeting but for the new 
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society section itself.40 Its chairman noted as instrumental to the sections’ founding the 
work he had done in previous years in the Clinical Surgical Society meetings to bring 
“to our minds, perhaps more forcibly than ever before, the necessity of doing something 
to find out whether our hospitals are really doing the work they are intended to do, that 
we think they are doing.”41 Far from being a career-ending disaster, as the preface 
describes it, Codman’s cartoon had largely achieved for Codman’s cause exactly the 
results he had hoped it would.42 
 Progress like this, as well as the not insignificant number of accomplished surgeons 
willing to work under Codman’s conditions at the Codman Hospital, belie Codman’s 
autobiographical characterization of himself as a lone outsider whose reforms were 
futile and professional status in crisis. It also suggests that at the least, Codman had a 
small but powerful band of colleagues willing to be in his corner. Codman’s own 
assertion that “everybody,” as he put it in the above passage, agreed that he was right in 
his aims (if misguided in his methods) indicates that his corner might in fact have been 
quite crowded. Indeed, letters from his archive indicate that Codman’s ideas had found 
purchase at the time of the preface’s appearance in 1934, and not only at the MGH. As 
one correspondent wrote in a letter to the author upon reading his preface, “I think you 
are a little impatient, your splendid End Result Idea has been generally accepted and 
acclaimed and is practiced to a greater degree than perhaps you are aware of.”43 
 Notably, even Codman’s own account in his autobiographical preface, in addition 
to its protestations that the End Result System was unsuccessful, contradicts his strong 
rhetoric of failure with clear description of success extending beyond the Boston 
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medical establishment: “In the case of the Woman’s Hospital in New York, almost 
everything that I recommended has been adopted, and I am glad to say improved on, in 
many details. Several other New York hospitals also accepted the suggestions to some 
extent.”44 His message was also moving upward. On the subject of one of the era’s most 
powerful bodies, the ACS, the preface observes another, albeit more tacit, victory for his 
End Result System. “Whatever historians may ultimately conclude, I am personally 
satisfied that the End Result Idea took an important part in the founding of the 
College.”45 
 The contradictions in the narrative pose questions about why Codman chose such 
an absolute and inflexible rendering of himself—as living a life of futility, on the 
outskirts of the medical profession—in the first place, particularly since, sotto voce, the 
attendant details always seemed to contradict his self-portrayal. Indeed, in spite of his 
gloomy self-assessment, nearly every venture described in the autobiography 
simultaneously offers a contrasting indication of success. Peppered throughout the 
preface are small celebrations of his contributions to medicine, with assurances to the 
reader that these contributions were not just useful but vital. Even Codman’s cartoon had 
achieved its own measure of success by the time of the writing of the preface. As 
Codman himself describes, the cartoon had been “mounted on cloth, arranged like a 
folding map, bound and placed for safe keeping in the Boston Medical Library.”46 Still 
dedicated, however, to his outsider narrative, Codman considered the cartoon’s 
preservation, along with the willingness of MGH to have him back, “remarkable,” a 
characterization possible only in a text so rhetorically preoccupied with creating 
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Codman’s story as one of professional disaster that these sorts of events must be 
positioned as unexpected surprises. 
  To explain the autobiography’s tone, one might suspect that Codman had suffered 
some sort of fall from grace between the period the preface describes and his publication 
of The Shoulder. There is, however, ample evidence to suggest that Codman was by 
1934, the date of the book’s publication, respected, even beloved.47 With a sense of 
appreciation, a reviewer of The Shoulder concluded, “If we had to answer the question, 
‘What is Dr. Codman’s book like?’ in one sentence, the reply would be, ‘It is just like Dr. 
Codman,’ which is high praise.”48 And when Codman died eight years later, his 
reputation seemed to remain in good standing. In addition to summarizing Codman’s 
numerous historical contributions to medicine, an obituary in the New England Journal of 
Medicine warmly described Codman as “affectionate, thoughtful, fair, a good 
companion . . . remarkably free from pretense and affectation, uncompromising” and as 
possessing an “attractive whimsical streak.”49 It continued, “much of his purpose was 
accomplished. . . . An end-result system was created not only at [the MGH] but over the 
whole country, an epoch-making achievement: all patients must be followed, for years if 
necessary; everyone must explain his bad results.”50 
 This was hardly the rabble-rousing Codman of the autobiography, whose pursuit of 
the End Result System was so single-minded and unpopular that he feared for his own 
sanity.51 Nor indeed was this the Codman for whom late-century historians would select 
words like “difficult”52 and “iconoclastic”53 in partial explanation for the failure of his 
system. Clearly, if these obituary accounts are accurate, Codman’s End Result System 
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had not been abandoned. Yet this was the image and story that he creates in his preface. 
This draws attention to the curious ambivalences of Codman’s life story, to the explicit 
framing of that life as that of a futile yet simultaneously successful reformer. It also 
reveals that the personal descriptions that fill Codman’s professional work are in large 
part a strategic framing of his self, crafted and deployed to achieve a desired affect.  
 In many ways, the intended circulation of The Shoulder accounts for the curious 
form of Codman’s autobiography. In his epilogue, where he specifically addresses the 
fellows of the ACS, Codman notes that he crafted his preface to rankle surgeons into 
reorienting themselves in relation to both himself and his End Result System. Indeed, 
extratextually, in a circular sent around to the ACS fellows, Codman had already 
indicated that there was actually little reason for them to read very much if any of the 
monograph on the shoulder. He explained that in order to “attain some of [the book’s] 
main purpose,” they should “read the preface and epilogue attentively” but only “as much 
of the shoulder part that may be of interest.”54 Though the actual study of the shoulder, 
the book’s “meat layer,” stood on its own as an important contribution to orthopedics and 
anatomy, Codman did not see this study as the crucial ingredient for his “literary 
sandwich.” Rather, it was merely the right sort of joint to connect his readers to his ideas. 
Or, as Codman puts it in the epilogue, shifting metaphors away from sandwiches to hot-
air balloons: “The portion of the book on the shoulder is the balloon, but the really 
important part of the expedition is in the basket below, which contains the preface and 
epilogue.”55 (See Figure 3.) Codman further clarifies that with such things in the basket, 
no publisher would have published The Shoulder. And so it was explicitly to maintain 
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these parts that Codman went to great lengths to have the text printed himself, privately 
and at his own expense.56 
 The epilogue goes on to predict that the ACS fellows would find his end result 
message as well as his methods—of placing this message around his study of the 
shoulder—distasteful. But, he tells them almost triumphantly, there was nothing that they 
could do about it. His hot-air balloon, and thus also the basket beneath, could not be shot 
down from the sky. Indeed, the only thing that could bring it down would be a better 
book on the shoulder, and that, Codman says confidently, will “take some time.” Until 
then, his balloon would remain in circulation, carrying its “unpopular load,” 
“invulnerable” to whatever kind of “missile” the ACS fellows might find to hurl at it and 
spreading its message of end results far and wide—wherever the wind might take it.57  
 This clarifies much both about the text of The Shoulder and its reception in its own 
time. And by and large, it met with success. As Frederic Washburn, another of Codman’s 
frequent targets for ridicule at the MGH,58 put it in his history of MGH, “as far as the 
Massachusetts General Hospital was concerned Dr. Codman was not allowed to remain a 
martyr.”59 
 This is not a radical reinterpretation of Codman’s work. Indeed, it follows the rather 
lengthy reading directions that open the preface,60 which make clear that the text has 
more in common with the literature of irony than conventional medical autobiography.61 
In keeping with this genre, Codman offers fair warning to his readership that something 
different is in the works: “Things which have become conventionalized,” he writes, “like 
prefaces, funeral services, wedding vows, and legal preambles are to be suspected of 
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evading responsibility.”62 He goes even further, remarking that his work is intended to 
raise his readers’ “defense-reaction” by use of ridicule and hyperbole, since this method 
would ultimately yield results more quickly than a “presentation of facts.”63 Quite 
explicitly, then, Codman’s preface is intended to stand as something more than a 
recitation of a medical life story. Instead, the text tacitly encourages us to understand it 
on its own terms, perhaps as its own hyperbolic act, much like an eight-foot cartoon, only 
this time accompanying a classic medical treatise on the shoulder. 
 This rereading of Codman’s life and work highlights the peculiarities of Codman’s 
reception later in the century. For though by and large late-century commentators at this 
time read more widely and contextualized Codman more diligently than Codman himself 
did in his own writing, their placement of Codman as a historical figure still privileged 
his personal and professional failure, set around events familiar to readers of the 
autobiography in the 1910 to 1917 period. Once this ironic reading of Codman’s own 
work and of the related sources unsettles the easy reading of Codman’s reforms as having 
dramatically failed in its own time, the narratives of the late twentieth century take on a 
new significance.  
 
Codman: The Renaissance  
By the late 1960s and early 1970s, American medicine was in crisis. Over the past 
decade, the public had witnessed a steady stream of news stories exposing a medical 
establishment to protect itself rather than its patients: the American Medical 
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Association’s campaign against Medicare in the early 1960s, Henry Beecher’s 1966 
whistle-blowing article on the appalling state of biomedical research ethics, and the 1973 
investigatory hearings on the Tuskegee Syphilis Study are but a few of the better known 
examples. In some ways, these accounts of medicine were a natural consequence of the 
well-known critiques of authority that had emerged in the American public and academic 
spheres more generally in this era. And if there was ever an institution that lent itself to 
this kind of critique, it was American medicine, appearing as it did to public and critics 
alike a largely cohesive force driven by a structural thirst for power.  
 In academia, “anti-psychiatrists” like Thomas Szasz and R. D. Laing had joined 
Ivan Illich, Thomas McKeown, and others in a powerful critique of medicine’s historical 
trajectory, showing it to be less a branch of inexorably progressing science that had 
meaningfully improved health, and more like the product of a series of professionalizing 
moments designed to medicalize the American public.64 Eliot Freidson summed up what 
was perhaps the most widely accepted view of medicine’s historical trajectory in his 
enormously influential 1970 Professions of Medicine, writing that “a medical system 
based on professional autonomy” had increased scientific knowledge, but had also 
“impeded the improvement of the social modes of applying that knowledge,” and 
encouraged the profession to be blind to its own shortcomings.65 It seemed increasingly 
apparent that medicine’s professional authority had not been acquired and exercised in 
the public interest,66 and that the result had been an overly authoritative medical 
establishment of questionable effectiveness that threatened to dehumanize all those who 
sought medical treatment.67 
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 Medicine’s critics gave the impression of a disinterested, authority-driven, but 
largely autonomous enterprise that had, some thought, lost sight of its humanity in the 
wake of technical and scientific advance, demonstrating in the process how dangerous 
authority and professional autonomy could be. The concurrent and consequential 
emphasis on rights that emerged in the wake of these events focused around the 
intervention of others—from law, philosophy, religion, and the humanities—into 
medicine to counter and correct medicine’s overly authoritative cultural status.68 Indeed, 
the new social historians of medicine felt a pronounced sense of mission as well, an 
activist sense that historians too would be a part of medicine’s reform. One tenet of this 
was to examine medicine’s history to find the “roots of medical dehumanisation” in order 
to better understand the contemporary medical moment.69 
 Under different circumstances, Codman might have posed yet another example of 
just such a dehumanizing root, due to his desire to impose an “industrial model”70 that 
carried with it by the 1970s a standard set of dehumanizing implications.71 But it is 
perhaps not surprising that given the antiprofessional climate, it was Codman’s clashes 
with authority that brought him the greatest attention. Reverby’s 1981 incisive analysis of 
Codman is particularly responsive to this strand. Tracing the potential parallels between 
Codman and the contemporary moment, it documents his losing battle with fellow 
physicians characterized by Codman’s own assertive reforming character in the face of 
the profession’s unified resistance. “[E]ven if Codman had been a less acerbic character, 
more willing to compromise,” it notes, “it is perhaps less speculative to assume that the 
end of the story would have been the same, given the ideological ascendency of 
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physicians at the time.”72 
 Such readings of Codman’s story brought him new life. The return of his self-
constructed, colorful persona fulfilled the need to recast medicine as humanistic and 
therapeutic, and his emphasis on outcomes and the transparency they promised 
demonstrated to critics that the medical establishment would preempt any future bad acts. 
Having returned to print in 1965, thanks (as Codman had predicted) to the still-
exceptional study of the shoulder,73 Codman’s preface seemed to describe a foundational 
moment when a man and his proposed outcome measurement system of reform had 
challenged medicine’s rising professional authority and been defeated. In returning to that 
touchstone, and claiming it for themselves, commentators at the end of the century could 
show that medicine was culturally mature and clinically advanced enough to embrace the 
kind of outcome measurement Codman had called for.  
 Another critical opportunity provided by Codman’s text was that “the recalcitrance 
and self-interest of his contemporaries” that had prevented Codman’s system from being 
taken up could now be corrected.74 Quoting from Codman’s text and appealing to his 
spirit thus came to serve as a performative expression of remorse for the policies of the 
previous, ethically myopic generation. In Codman, reformers could mediate between two 
moments across the century, one marked as the beginning of a profession gone wrong, 
the other now marked (via this return to Codman) as the end of that era. Indeed, in the 
years that mediated his work and the present, Codman’s commentators asserted that 
Codman had shamefully been forgotten, consumed by a “shadowy past.”75After having 
been “unappreciated during his career” and “largely uncelebrated,”76 his ideas “were 
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either forgotten, suppressed or in their critical dimensions abandoned”77 in the years 
following the resignation and cartoon incidents.78 The fact that Codman’s name had 
disappeared from accounts of hospital organization in the interim—unlike, for example, 
that of perhaps the most obvious and lasting beacons of medical efficiency reform, the 
Mayo brothers—was, under these circumstances, auspicious. It historically accounted for 
the imperfect state of the medical system at the end of the twentieth century, and also 
offered a fresh symbol and vocabulary for reform. Codman’s own self-proclaimed 
significance in the history of the ACS was downplayed or omitted, as was the suggestion 
that the ACS and its standardizing successor the Joint Commission had their own 
complex histories of efficiency reform, which could clarify what might be vital 
particulars about when, where, why, and perhaps most vitally if outcome measurement 
had been lost. 
 Over the next decades, a series of articles, speeches, and monographs exalted the 
Codman story. Almost every one of these texts cited Codman’s autobiographical preface 
as a critical source, and some quoted the text extensively.79 Though these works varied in 
their focus and level of detail, they nearly always reified the narrative of failure with 
which Codman had repeatedly endowed himself, and most particularly in the 
autobiography. And they nearly always also encapsulated that failure by describing his 
emblematic failed reforming moments: his departure from MGH and the case of the 
inflammatory cartoon. 
   But rather than acknowledging the curious asymmetry between rhetorical gloss and 
narrative detail that is so palpable in the autobiography and in Codman’s other works, 
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notably his text Hospital Efficiency, or even examining Codman’s reception in its own 
time, these texts offered a less complicated retelling of Codman’s adventures that often 
mimicked Codman’s own play with the details of his life. Following the preface’s 
creative spirit, some neglected to note that Codman’s rift with MGH was not permanent 
(he was, as he himself notes, later rehired at the MGH).80 Others implied that his rehiring 
came only after Codman’s reforming impulses had died back down again, and he had 
been forced to reintegrate himself into conventional medical life. Others suggested, 
following another thread of Codman’s writing, that World War I had intervened to bring 
an end to his End Result System.81 Important details from the autobiography are also 
omitted in their accounting of the reception to his cartoon, with most texts simply 
narrating the moment as one purely of censure and rejection.82 And though Codman’s 
rhetorical positioning of himself as an outsider was itself mitigated by details he had 
provided in his text, commentators seemed content to place his outright rejection on the 
level of fact. Thus we read that Codman’s colleagues “scorned his efforts,”83 and learn 
that this was a direct result, as one author put it, of the “jealously guarded balance of 
privilege and power within the hospital,”84 which made any question of oversight 
anathema.85 
Those who wrote these new Codman translations also found in his preface a theme 
that had escaped comment when it was first published, namely, his self-styled status as a 
prophet. Bemoaning repeatedly the lack of recognition he had received in his own time, 
Codman noted, “if the prophet is confident of the value of his service, he may keep his 
equanimity in spite of the jeers of his contemporaries.”86 What gave him further 
This is a preprint of an accepted article scheduled to appear in the Bulletin of the 
History of Medicine, vol. 90, no. 3 (Fall 2016). It has been copyedited but not 
paginated. Further edits are possible. Please check back for final article publication 
details.     
 
 
 24 
consolation, he continued, was the knowledge that “although the End Result Idea may not 
achieve its entire fulfillment for several generations,”87 its time would most certainly 
come. While these passages garnered perhaps understandably little serious attention from 
his contemporaries, they offered in this new moment the final confirmation that his story 
and ideas had really been directed to this later generation, who were forging a profession 
that could finally accommodate Codman’s “clinical truth.” Commentaries poured out, 
with titles like “Ernest A. Codman, MD (1869–1940), the End Result Idea, and the 
Product of a Hospital: The Challenge of a Man Ahead of His Time and Perhaps Ours” 
and “Evaluation of the Care of Patients: Codman Revisited.” One of these observed that 
Codman had been living “in advance of his time,” even “light years ahead of the thinking 
and the culture, a reality that he was well aware of and slightly bemused by.”88 Another 
affectionately labeled him a rabble-rouser, whose message of truth had been buried by the 
power-mad politics of the medical profession out of which it had emerged.89 A third 
bemoaned the fact that Codman had been interred in an anonymous grave in his wife’s 
family plot (not as he had once planned, under a headstone proclaiming, here lies “Ernest 
Amory Codman: killed by colleagues”).90 And this, as one observed, in the same ominous 
year when Hitler was “overrunning much of Europe.”91 
Codman’s narrative had caught fire. Originally only in the purview of quality 
assessment proponents, writings on Codman now came from multiple sources—
orthopedists, medical students, medical ethicists, historians, surgeons, policy makers—
and found publication in a wide array of journals like Spine, Milbank Quarterly, New 
England Journal of Medicine, International Journal of Technology Assessment in Health 
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Care, Journal of Health Politics, and Policy and Law, with Mallon’s biography of 
Codman serving as a capstone.92 Often using his autobiographical preface as a handbook, 
this small flood of articles signaled that the uptake of end result measures would indicate 
medicine’s commitment to enacting the modern, objective, evidence-based change that 
had always been its proper future. Their subject matter also implied that this could be 
done without ever having to leave the confines of medicine’s own history. There was no 
need for the intrusion of nonmedical experts, those bioethical and legal “strangers at the 
bedside” to linger in medicine, critically looking over physicians’ shoulders.93 Codman’s 
failure was implicitly appealing: it offered an opportunity for medicine to create itself 
anew at century’s end, to acknowledge its own shortcomings, to divorce itself from its 
unhappy past, and, finally, to show that it had only to look deep within itself, via 
Codman, to reform.  
Of course, in many circles, Codman was not in need of resurrection, as his name 
had never really left circulation. Though he was known for his contributions in many 
different fields,94 it was thanks in particular to his remarkable study of the shoulder—the 
“balloon” of his book—and his contributions to the field of shoulder surgery that 
Codman was particularly remembered among orthopedists and surgeons throughout the 
decades between his death and this later period.95 Indeed, on the occasion of The 
Shoulder’s second republication, on its fiftieth anniversary in 1984, a new foreword was 
added, declaring that “although there have been many volumes on the shoulder since 
Codman’s, we all must admit that this monumental piece of work has been the basis and 
the groundwork from which all other works have evolved.”96 
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Yet, the “resurrection” of Codman still coalesced around the story of Codman’s 
reforming failure, his absence from the intervening period, and the resulting historical 
disjuncture that his rejection had irrevocably caused. This narrative was an explicitly 
disconnected one, in which the reform road not taken had marked the intervening years as 
missed opportunities, and Codman’s return as a particular kind of catharsis. It brought to 
light a system that explicitly focused on transparency as a critical outcome of outcome 
measurement and a story that related the rejection of this system to his authority-hungry 
peers, either because they considered medicine unable to stand such scrutiny, as Reverby 
had suggested,97 or because they simply refused to be subjected to it. In this process, the 
late-century return of Codman seemed also to mark a posthumous triumph for his 
particular brand of literary politicking. Through his ironic self-telling, he had perfectly 
crafted a place for himself in the story of medicine across the century. 
 
End Results 
Given the current emphasis on outcome measurement in health care, it is important to 
carefully parse the significance of Codman’s End Result System in the late twentieth 
century. After a close reading of his writing and of all the journal articles praising his 
personal virtues, there still remains, after all, his “common-sense notion that every 
hospital should follow every patient it treats, long enough to determine whether or not the 
treatment has been successful, and then to inquire ‘if not, why not?’ with a view to 
preventing similar failures in future.” This article has argued that the return of his system 
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was tied to Codman’s new niche in an antiprofessional historical moment, but does this 
assessment give enough credit to Codman’s system itself? That is, was his “industrial 
model” truly useful to health care?98 
Reading further into Codman’s preface and other writings, it becomes clear that the 
End Result System was not a fixed, objective measure that existed easily outside of 
Codman’s persona. Indeed, for Codman, the End Result System was something 
inherently personal. In the autobiography, he commits his own life history to an end 
results chart, suggesting that end results as a concept encompassed far more than just 
medical study, practice, or reform. Furthermore, his preface itself stands as an End Result 
iteration, conflating in literary terms his own personal failure with the failure of his 
system. This raises the important possibility that the very concept of efficiency—a term 
that had spawned its own branch of science—carried a special meaning to Codman, and 
was in his mind a concept broad enough to accommodate his ironic medical self-telling.99 
Late-century commentators seemed tacitly to understand this. As one writer put it, 
Codman’s life and his End Result idea were “of a piece,”100 and his “monomania” for end 
results extended beyond both the short period he describes in the autobiography and the 
particulars of his life in medicine.  
Perhaps more tellingly, by the narrower and more conventional terms of efficiency 
in which Codman’s system was later read, his End Result System had a much more 
checkered history of success in its implementation, such that it could not have been an 
easy model for late-century outcome measurement. Though it had inspired useful texts, 
including Codman’s work on the shoulder and his earlier Registry of Bone Sarcoma, the 
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End Result System had not proven a successful protocol for the running of an entire 
hospital, a fact to which the failure of Codman’s own hospital—run as a kind of proof of 
concept for the wholesale adoption of his principles—clearly attests.101 To Codman’s 
disappointment, one of his central policies, of publishing the results of its surgeries and 
distributing this information to the general public, did not whet the public’s appetite for 
treatment there. Likewise, other hospitals that adopted Codman’s policies wholesale 
found they were sometimes too complex or cumbersome in their requirements or simply 
did not accomplish what they were supposed to.102 Codman implied that the particular 
disinterest in results among the general public was part of the larger conspiracy of 
“humbug” his cartoon illustrated, but it is important to note that this played out in much 
the same way later in the century when, in 1986, the Health Care Financing 
Administration (HCFA) released what came to be called the “death list,” a report on 
hospital quality based on the outcomes of 10.8 million Medicare patients.103 
The story of the “Death List” was covered in detail in the New York Times,104 and 
came to be widely panned as unhelpful and potentially misleading, with its promise of 
“clinical truth” unfulfilled due to the incredibly complex systems its data were supposed 
to parse.105 Medical consumers simply did not seem to care about the report, seeming 
either privy to these problems already, such that they did not take the HCFA stories as 
shedding new light on medical practice, or simply unconvinced that outcome 
measurement could capably give them the information that they needed to know.106 This 
underwhelming outcome was widely discussed,107 with some hypothesizing that 
consumers might be compelled more by “preferences for and by physicians, tradition, 
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convenience and word of mouth—not to mention sheer randomness” than they were by 
outcome measurement.108 Whatever the precise reasons, in this case outcome 
measurement did not translate in either medical or lay circles into effective results.  
In a widely cited article written three years after the HCFA data had been released, 
health policy expert Donald Berwick, who had weighed in on the “Death List,” seemed 
similarly to take the Codman genre to task, writing, “Whose ends results are we to study? 
The capacity for vagueness is frightening.”109 He continued,  
We risk holding accountable for end results people who little more determine those 
results than the seven astronauts of Challenger determined the end results of the 
shuttle. It is not that physicians are never responsible for outcomes, but rather that 
we have so little to tell us when it is the doctors, and when it is the systems they 
work in, that make success and failure. Doctors are people acting in processes. . . . 
Everyone recites the myth of physician power; few who study quality on the ground 
believe it.110 
Noting that it is a “special form of arrogance to imply that people of an earlier time were 
somehow less complex than we of today,”111 Berwick called out Codman’s system as too 
absolute and held Codman culpable for having missed the potential destructive 
implications of a system of responsibility that did not accommodate process. He also 
offered an implicit critique of the contemporary scholarly literature that focused so much 
on the profession as a primary historical subject. The story of physician power, he noted, 
could not by itself account for medicine’s key problems. The historical and social 
complexity of such a system as American medicine ought not be reduced to a story of 
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authority building followed by decades of defensive tactics. 
And yet Berwick did not discard the Codman story. Instead, he found in its 
narrative of medical martyrdom an apt cautionary tale for contemporary medical hubris. 
“We better honor his memory,” he noted, “if we have the insight to see how we, too, 
resist the Codmans of today.”112 Like so many other texts, then, Berwick’s narrative 
moved beyond the End Result System to celebrate Codman’s life or, rather, the life 
Codman had fashioned: the epic of a righteous, unconventional, rebellious doctor 
working to reform a resistant establishment.113 His hero was not Codman the successful 
reformer or author of a classic orthopedic text, not a Codman whose life could be 
captured in all of its complexity in the more measured terms of historical analysis, or 
even Codman the creator of the End Result System. It was instead the Codman self-
crafted as a rejected prophet in the preface to The Shoulder. It is this icon, with his 
constant play on the details of his own life in the service of his professional goals, his 
eccentricity and quixotism, that Berwick finally embraces.  
Other key figures in the resurgence of outcome measurement at the end of the 
twentieth century—Albert Mulley, John Wennberg, Avedis Donabedian among them—
did much the same. They often evoked Codman’s End Result, but spent more time 
actually discussing Codman’s story than his precise ideas. And the systems of outcome 
measurement ideas they helped install bore little more than a passing resemblance to his 
system.114 The exact nature of Codman’s system was simply not the point.  
 And it still isn’t. Codman’s story still resonates today, and commentators continue 
to summon his spirit when the occasion calls for it. In 2014, amid great fanfare, the then 
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president-elect of the ACS spearheaded a project to raise twenty thousand dollars to erect 
a headstone for Codman. The inscription was a quote of Codman’s own: “It may take a 
hundred years for my ideas to be accepted.”115 (See Figure 4.) The accompanying story in 
the Boston Globe was a familiar one. Titled “Honoring a Once-Scorned Voice for 
Medical Openness,” it too recapitulated the story of Codman’s resignation, of his cartoon, 
and of the rejection of his End Result System.116 
 This rereading of Codman’s autobiography sounds important notes about how 
Codman ought to be read into the history of professionalization and reform in both his 
own and the late-century period, and not simply or even at all because it raises the 
possibility that we have misunderstood or underplayed his successes and misread him as 
a failure. Rather, a close reading of Codman’s preface to The Shoulder and its late-
century recapitulations draws our attention to historical strands of significance that our 
focus on the conventional elements of medicine’s history have made difficult to see. In its 
movement across time, the preface suggests something of the critical and remarkably 
enduring power of Codman’s kind of aesthetic play with literature, with identity, and 
with the personal. In doing so, it asks us to expand and flex our sense of how medical 
identity was constituted in both of these periods, so that we can understand not just how 
to signify moments like this, but also how to recognize them in the first place, making 
possible new perspectives on the politics of identity as they interacted with long-standing 
themes of professional power, clinical practice, and medical effectiveness.  
 The Codman story also offers legibility to an argument about the significance of the 
aesthetics of representation more generally, as itself an operative and critical theme, at 
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least in the history of medical efficiency and quality assessment, if not in the 
determination of medical meaning across the twentieth century more generally.117 For in 
their largely unintentional reproduction of Codman’s play with identity, Codman’s late-
century commentators implicitly replicated not Codman’s brand of personal politicking, 
nor exactly the substance of his claims, but rather the character and quality of his stylized 
life. Indeed, perhaps in its own time, but certainly in the waning years of the century, 
what surprises is how essential the qualities of Codman’s crafted self turn out to be. It is 
for the way in which it actually breaks with and begins to move at an aesthetically 
inclined tangent to the familiar themes of twentieth-century American medical history 
that the story of The Shoulder breaks new ground.  
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Figure Legends 
 
Figure 1. Codman’s chart of his “life history.” Ernest Amory Codman, The Shoulder, 
Rupture of the Supraspinatus Tendon and Other Lesions in or about the Subacromial 
Bursa (Boston: Thomas Todd Company, 1934), vi. 
 
Figure 2. “The Back Bay Golden Good Ostrich,” a cartoon by Codman’s friend Philip 
Hale, unveiled at the Suffolk District Medical Society’s “Meeting for the Discussion of 
Hospital Efficiency” at the Boston Medical Library on January 6, 1915. Ernest Amory 
Codman, “Preface,” in The Shoulder, Rupture of the Supraspinatus Tendon and Other 
Lesions in or about the Subacromial Bursa (Boston: Thomas Todd Company, 1934), 
xxvi. 
 
Figure 3. Codman’s Hot Air Balloon. Ernest Amory Codman, “Epilogue,” in The 
Shoulder, Rupture of the Supraspinatus Tendon and Other Lesions in or about the 
Subacromial Bursa (Boston: Thomas Todd Company, 1934), 29. 
 
Figure 4. Codman’s new headstone, dedicated July 2014 by a former Massachusetts 
General Hospital chief of surgery and president-elect of the American College of 
Surgeons, Andrew Warshaw. It rests in the family plot of Codman’s wife, Katherine 
Bowditch, at the Mount Auburn Cemetery in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Photo credit: 
Charles Giorno Photography/American College of Surgeons. 
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